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1. Introduction  
In December 2009, the whole world looked at Copenhagen expecting the 15th Conference of the 
Parties (COP 15) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to come up with 
a new treaty to address global climate change. Given the perceived urgency of the issue that had 
crystallized in the allocation of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore, an 
unprecedented number of high-level diplomats and heads of state gathered in Copenhagen. All in 
all, more than 40’000 participants attended the negotiations as negotiators and observers, 
stretching the capacity of the conference venue. Church bells were ringing to symbolize the 
significance of the event for mankind as a whole, and the media were full of information on this 
memorable gathering.  
Yet, COP 15 did not yield the expected outcome. The “Copenhagen Accord” saved the negotiation 
process from a complete failure and opened a back door to move on in the following years, but no 
agreement was reached on emissions commitments beyond 2012.  
 
2. Analysing the determinants of negotiation failures and successes 
Are country preferences so different that they cannot be reconciled? Or is there just a very strong 
expectation to be able to free-ride on other countries’ efforts? Standard economic theory suggests 
that mitigation of climate change represents a prisoners’ dilemma situation typically arising in the 
context of public goods’ provision. As benefits from greenhouse gas emission reduction are non-
rival and non-excludable on a global level, the incentive for free-riding is difficult to overcome. A 
number of studies highlighted different facets of this problem already at the early times of the 
international climate change negotiation process, and expressed strong scepticism about any 
possible success (Victor, 2001, Barrett, 1998, Finus, 2001). A central assumption of this literature 
is that there is no supranational institution that can impose a treaty with emissions mitigation 
commitments on governments and actually enforce compliance. Thus, emissions mitigation 
treaties need to be self-enforcing. This can be supported by limiting membership (Carraro and 
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Marchiori, 2003), or linking emissions mitigation treaties with agreements that cover different 
policy issues (Toth et al., 2001). 
Yet, the successful entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the success of other international 
environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol convinced most scholars that, at least 
under certain conditions, progress can be reached (for a recent review, see Young, 2011). 
Apparently, simple game theoretic models do not sufficiently explain the outcome of negotiations. 
This is increasingly acknowledged by game-theorists themselves, who recognize that 
international cooperation can lead to reductions in transaction costs and the generation of trust 
(Finus and Rundshagen, 2006). Moreover, without international negotiations, the relevant actors 
may not even be able to acquire sufficient information to actually define their position (Haas et al. 
1993). 
Thus the negotiation process itself is important, as well as the specific legal and administrative 
system in which this process is embedded. The latter is covered by a strand of the literature in 
international law that discusses how global governance rules have evolved towards a system of 
administrative law, which is binding on countries, without even requiring explicit consent from 
national parliaments (see e.g. Gupta, this issue). The decisions of the subsidiary bodies to the 
UNFCCC are examples for this law. It is also become increasingly likely that emitters become liable 
on supranational and national levels (Faure and Peeters, 2011). Such legal conditions influence 
the incentives of the different parties in the negotiation process, and, most crucially, their 
willingness to find a consensus. In addition, many factors related to specific characteristics of the 
individual delegations influence negotiation outcomes. In fact, much of the success or failure of a 
UNFCCC meeting seems to depend on the negotiation skills and tactical moves of the conference 
presidency, and on strategies employed by the different country delegations. In a critical situation 
at COP 3 in Kyoto 1997 similar to the last days of Copenhagen, a skilful handling of the final night 
negotiations by COP president Estrada led to the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol (Depledge, 
2005). In contrast, the inept handling of the Copenhagen conference by the Danish Prime Minister 
Rasmussen – who even did not know the basic rules of procedure of the UNFCCC – contributed to 
its failure (Michaelowa, 2010). 
International negotiation theory developed in the realm of political science / international 
relations theory (see, e.g., Odell, 2000, and 2006) focuses precisely on these particular strategies 
and their potential for success. They also consider that individual negotiators’ (or country 
delegations’) skills and strategic approaches may interact with the countries’ exogenous 
characteristics such as their power resources, and with the perceived salience of the particular 
issue at hand (see Bailer, this issue). From this perspective, it becomes possible not only to analyse 
the general probability of reaching an agreement, but also to assess the advantages and 
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disadvantages of certain strategic choices for individual country delegations and their success in 
the international negotiation process.  
Some particularly interesting countries to examine are the large emerging economies of Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa (BASIC), which have become crucial players in the context of the 
UNFCCC. Narlikar (2010) analyzes some general features of their negotiation behaviour across 
different international policy areas. This special issue “Negotiating Climate Change” includes a 
case study for India (Michaelowa and Michaelowa). Another country-case included is Russia, 
which, as the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China, the US and the EU, and due 
to its control over a large share of the world’s known fuel resources, is an important player, and 
yet, its strategies have been poorly understood so far (see Andonova and Alexieva, this issue).  
In addition, it appears to be at least as important to analyze the strategic options for poor 
developing countries. Many of these countries are expected to suffer the most from the 
consequences of climate change while, at the same time, being the least responsible for this 
development. By definition, they lack the external power resources that help richer countries push 
through their positions. Yet, climate change negotiations have revealed that even very small and 
economically powerless countries such as those of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) may 
at times become quite influential (see Betzold et al., this issue). At the same time, large and 
economically extremely powerful countries like the United States have been sidelined, at least to 
some extent, in the context of the Kyoto-Protocol.  
What drives the positions taken up at the international level, and the strategies used, and which 
of these strategies appear to be successful? This special edition makes use of a number of 
complementary qualitative and quantitative methods to answer these questions. Using cross-
country regression analysis, the first two papers on the determinants of success (Weiler, this 
issue) and of negotiation strategies (Bailer, this issue) present a number of regularities that are 
re-examined in the subsequent case studies on India (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, this issue), 
AOSIS (Betzold et al., this issue) and Russia (Andonova and Alexieva, this issue). The case studies 
thus deepen the analyses of the general papers. In some cases, they also provide support for 
theoretical hypotheses whose results remain ambiguous in the general papers due to data 
constraints and difficulties regarding comparable variable specification. Moreover, a conceptual 
paper from a wider theoretical perspective (Gupta, this issue) examines the role of normative 
principles and the legal setting, and their impact on the individual country positions and 
strategies.  
All studies in this volume use a common database, which includes three novel data sets developed 
in the framework of a two-year joint research project funded by the Swiss Network for 
International Studies (SNIS). The first data set is derived from a series of interviews with country 
delegates and the second from hand coding of country submissions to the UNFCCC secretariat. 
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The third dataset is based on country statements made during the negotiations as reported by the 
Earth Negotiation Bulletin. The data covers the period from COP 13 in Bali 20072 to COP 16 in 
Cancun 2010 with an emphasis on the period around Copenhagen. A detailed discussion of this 
data is provided in the Appendix 1 of Weiler (this issue). 
 
3. Negotiating climate change: some key results 
While each of the individual papers in this volume presents a wealth of specific conclusions and 
policy recommendations, this section focuses on selected topics that appear across the different 
studies whatever their focus and methodology: 
A) The role of the national political economy 
B) The role of accepted norms 
C) The role of delegation characteristics 
The discussion of these topics will provide some insights into interesting results of this special 
edition, along with an illustration of the complementarities between the econometric, theoretical 
and case study analysis used in the different studies. 
 
A) The role of the national political economy 
Both the Indian and the Russian case studies stress the necessity to understand the positions and 
strategies adopted at the UNFCCC not simply as a product of international interaction during the 
conferences, but also as a product of the national political economies influenced by local 
constituencies. For India, there is strong evidence that international positions have changed along 
with the emergence of a national climate policy dialogue that was induced, among other things, 
by a broader understanding of India’s own vulnerability to climate change, by the awareness that 
long-term growth anyway requires some improvements in national energy efficiency, and by the 
awareness of the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanisms for private business 
(Michaelowa and Michaelowa, this issue). All three areas have become relevant for Russia as well 
(Andonova and Alexieva, this issue). This is true despite the fact that, as opposed to India, Russia’s 
vulnerability to climate change is somewhat compensated by benefits of climate change in some 
sectors, and that through its control over large fossil fuel reserves, the country is not directly 
constrained by a shortage in energy resources. Business launched a strong protest when the 
Russian government announced at COP 17 in Durban that it would not participate in the 2nd 
                                                     
2 COP 13 was chosen because it defined the “Bali Roadmap” specifying that a new treaty should be finalized 
by COP 15. 
 5 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. However, due to the crucial role of the presidency and 
government bureaucracy private business interest eventually appears to have little impact. 
The limited role of business in Russia’s autocratic setting supports the most central outcome by 
Bailer (this issue) who links the use of different strategies to national political institutions in a 
sample of about fifty countries. She finds that governments of democratic countries, although 
generally using more accommodating, value creating strategies, tend to use hard strategies when 
strong national lobby interests are concerned. The role of national interest groups diminishes 
(and eventually even turns to the opposite effect) for mixed or authoritarian regimes. 
 
B) The role of accepted norms 
All the studies in this special edition demonstrate the important role of accepted norms. Gupta 
(this issue) discusses how scientific developments over the last twenty years have helped to 
establish a consensus on the existence of man-made climate change. She also finds that this 
scientific consensus rendered the problem more “structured”, which should help finding an 
agreement. The emergence of the consensus and its implications are further illustrated by the 
examples of India (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, this issue) and Russia (Andonova and Alexieva, 
this issue). Clearly, it effectively deprived large emitter countries of their previous excuse for 
taking no action, and allowed countries jeopardized by climate change to benefit from the moral 
appeal of their positions and strategies. Even India found itself under substantial pressure when 
it was accused by other developing countries such as Bangladesh and the Maldives to be 
responsible for the 2009 deadlock in the international negotiation process. 
An even more impressive case of moral persuasion is discussed in the study of AOSIS, which has 
achieved notable success by alerting the world to the dramatic consequences its members will 
suffer given other countries’ irresponsible level of greenhouse gas emissions (Betzold et al., this 
issue). In his cross-sectional analysis of 56 countries Weiler (this issue) finds that, at given levels 
of other important determinants of negotiation success (such as external power resources 
measured in terms of GDP), vulnerability to climate change is generally linked significantly and 
positively to success in the international climate negotiations. In addition, these highly vulnerable 
countries tend to make more use of hard negotiation strategies (Bailer, this issue).  
While norms have been developed, accepted and successfully applied with respect to the scientific 
core questions of climate change, norms have not yet been developed regarding the question “who 
should take action where, when and why” (Gupta, this issue). How to allocate responsibilities and 
rights will thus be one of the most urgent challenges to negotiations in the coming years. 
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C) The role of delegation characteristics 
Apart from external power resources, such as GDP which is obviously important for success in 
international negotiations, and characteristics with a less obvious, but nonetheless strongly 
significant effect such as vulnerability (as highlighted above), internal power resources such as 
particular characteristics of the national delegation are typically considered in negotiation 
analysis. Just as similar studies in other fields of analysis, all empirical papers in this special 
edition primarily look at delegation size and the experience of the delegation leader because data 
for these variables can be most easily obtained in a way that is comparable across countries. 
However, the role of these variables appears much less strong than expected. Only the Russian 
case study fully corresponds to the expectations. For Russia, the empirical analysis shows a high 
score on scale of the different indicators of negotiation success (note, e.g., the tremendous 
concessions Russia obtained when presenting itself as the pivotal player that eventually allowed 
the Kyoto-Protocol to enter into force), a constantly large delegation, and a delegation leader with 
about fifteen years of diplomatic experience in the field (Andonova and Alexieva, this issue). 
However, looking at the details of the case study, one also notices that this does not translate into 
the activities that would usually be expected to provide the causal channel between internal 
power resources and success. In fact, despite its size and experience, the Russian delegation has 
remained relatively silent and inactive over the whole period of analysis. The Indian case study 
fully opposes the expected link. Throughout the years, the Indian delegation has always been 
remarkably small and yet successful in various dimensions – and notably so, when in 2009 the 
lead of the delegation was taken over by the new Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam 
Ramesh, who had absolutely no prior diplomatic experience in this field (Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa, this issue). Regarding AOSIS the size of individual country delegations was usually 
extremely small. It has increased over time, but if anything, this is interpreted as a factor that may 
have diverted these countries from their common objectives, and thus reduced their chances of 
success (Betzold et al., this issue). In the cross-country regressions presented by Weiler (this 
issue), delegation size is not significant in any of the specifications.  
However, case study evidence from AOSIS and India reveals that this should not be interpreted as 
evidence for the irrelevance of internal power resources. While large-n cross-country studies 
(such as Weiler, this issue; and Bailer, this issue) cannot go beyond the use of the above mentioned 
rough indicators, case studies can specify more refined attributes of the individual delegations. 
For the success of AOSIS, for instance, skilled leadership and the strong integration of outside 
expertise (from NGOs and legal scholars) into the delegation was deemed crucial for the group’s 
success (Betzold et al., this issue, especially footnote 10). In India, the above mentioned minister 
did not have any diplomatic experience in the field, but more than compensated this by past as an 
MIT trained economist and experienced statesman, who had already held other ministerial 
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positions, and who was very close to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and to the national media 
(notably for having managed the government’s successful national election campaign). Under his 
influence, climate change became a relevant topic in the Indian press, and India opened up 
internationally to become a proactive deal-maker with substantial value creating elements in its 
negotiation strategy at the level of the UNFCCC (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, this issue; for some 
more details, see also Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011).  
Moreover, an interesting feature of the Indian delegation is its continued reliance on experienced 
and knowledgeable delegation members, even if they change office, e.g. move from one ministry 
to the next, to academia, or even to foreign development agencies (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 
this issue). This could provide an interesting role model for other developing country delegations, 
who often struggle to find experienced delegation members given the important fluctuation of 
senior civil servants.  
 
4. Open questions 
Some other questions have to remain open here and call for further research. One major issue is 
the interaction of different countries’ strategies. In this special edition, this issue is taken up 
explicitly only by Gupta’s theoretical article. She suggests that the negotiations can substantially 
move forward only when all partners adopt value creating strategies and are ready to 
compromise. Another topic that has been only marginally explored by the studies in this volume 
is issue linkage across different fields of international negotiation. An exception is the paper by 
Andonova and Alexieva (this issue) who explain that WTO membership was an additional carrot 
attracting Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Gupta (this issue) addresses this topic from a more 
general perspective. She further notes possible issue-linkage between different topics within the 
UNFCCC negotiations. The multiplication of specific issues on the agenda has enlarged the win-set 
and possibly allows the parties to more easily find a compromise to the benefit of all. At the same 
time, new issues like LULUCF and REDD have weakened the cohesion of AOSIS (Betzold et al., this 
issue), which may reduce the odds of an agreement that is convincing from an environmental 
perspective. Thus when adding more topics and increasing complexity, it is not a priori clear 
whether this will be helpful or not (Gupta, this issue).  
It should be noted that the concept of “success” also changes between these two perspectives. In 
one case, reaching a compromise is in itself considered a success, while in the other case, success 
is seen primarily as a function of climate change mitigation. This is not necessarily the same. From 
an individual country’s perspective, there are even more ways to define success: First, success in 
terms of negotiation outcomes being as close as possible to a country delegation’s initial positions; 
second, success in terms of the national and international reputation earned by the delegation; 
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and third, success in terms of the “true needs” of the country’s population that may differ from the 
perceived preferences (or perhaps special interests) defended by the national delegation. When 
considering that the negotiations have not actually been completed, measurement of success in 
any of these dimensions becomes an even more daunting exercise. The outcome effectively 
becomes a moving target and not getting anything today may mean getting more tomorrow. Even 
the expected “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA), i.e., the situation with which 
a country should compare any proposal in order to decide about whether to go for or against it, 
must be conceived as non-stable, but dynamic, and changing over time and from one meeting to 
the next. 
This generates difficulties in analysing UNFCCC negotiations as compared to, e.g., negotiations at 
the European Union, to which negotiation theory has been applied much more frequently (see, 
e.g., Bailer, 2004, 2010). These methodological difficulties could not be solved by the studies 
compiled in this volume. However, the presentation of different concepts, indicators and research 
methods should help the reader to build his opinion on the issues at hand. 
Overall, the set of papers in this special edition provides unique insights into details of the UNFCCC 
negotiation process based on data that have never been explored so far, and on complementarities 
between quantitative and qualitative research methods. For this reason, it should be relevant for 
the climate policy community, academics and practitioners alike. Even for scholars not primarily 
interested in climate change related issues, it should be of interest as a new application of 
negotiation theory.  
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